First released in ‘Segunda Naturaleza‘ on 28 March 2009. Updated March 16, 2011
Prior to the financial crisis and as a prelude to the one we behold, we are witnessing a gradual but determined economic anemia. Since 2006.
The history of capitalism is marked by crisis. Definitely, since the 70′s we are witnessing a dip every 5 or 6 years. Systematically. Yet, the current one we endure, we ignore its internal mechanics: this is neither a cyclical crisis we ensue periodically nor a predictable structural collapse – so not analyzable in conventional terms.
Since capitalism exists per se in the dawn of the nineteenth century, the housing issue became a matter of essential focus. The issue is whether or not granting a mortgage to someone who has no assets, but offers reasonable assurance to invest the equivalent of 5 – 7 years earnings, which is the average housing cost. The loan is granted through a mortgage atop the object by itself, provided that the financial institution truthfully assesses the applicant’s income – say provided holder’s solvency. The financial institution does not usually covers further than 70 to 80% overall. The mechanism relies therefore on the holder’s complementary efforts.
However, in practice, since the late 90′s, the tendency in the United States has been encouraging a majority of citizens to become capitalist (whether they were solvents or not) and beginning with the house. The Bush administration pushed this ahead, banks operated with lax « after all, they said, why not lending to anyone. » Often, the assessment on the client’s financial coverage capacity depended if his face fitted, when not in practice, he was supposedly solvent. The bank saved itself because its solvency position no longer depended on the borrower’s sole creditworthy but especially on the intrinsic value of the property: so, if the holder failed to pay, the bank expropriated (sometimes people speak wrongly of seizure) and sold the house to redeem the debt. This system generalized up to December 2008. U.S. banks and European to a lesser extent, granted credit indiscriminately, especially low-income families and active minorities (Hispanics and African Americans), bestowing 100, 110 and even 120% of the property value with the reason that there is always some home remodeling to perform or new furniture to buy when you get settled in a new place. And in order to get a more tempting technique when possible, financial engineering used to propose a financial gimmick: namely, there was no capital refund thru the first 2 or 3 years, other than interests. The uncut gadget was escorted by variable interest rates, i.e. fluctuating, under the pretext that with time, « you’ll see your earnings will go up. » This is what has come to be called the doctrine of constant expansion.
Throughout the summer of 2007 roughly 1,700,000 American families loosed their homes, seized, evicted and their children threw out the street, frequently evicted from the school system. In fact expropriation measures were targeted at around 4,000,000 households, but the authorities responsible for executing the judgments of eviction – judges and police –refused regularly to enforce such unpopular measures. This impelled serious cash flow problems for a lot of credit institutions –to say bankruptcy as they were holding massive amounts of toxic loans (150 to 300,000 million dollars). The multiplier effect soon arose and the entire U.S. banking system realized it was holding failed, flawed, toxic mortgages: the so called subprime lending involved an extra interest rate, a bonus on the event of the loan holder was insolvent.
Yet we cannot talk of robbery; let us rather point to a cynical « brutalization » of the banking system inasmuch as the system decided not to deal with individuals (families, children and their risks), but with objects (the value of their risks). In an ethical and regular system, their loss statements should have been assessed, compulsory provision of funds required and finally the security authorities (central bank and stock exchange authorities) would have taken the necessary steps. Not so. Most financial institutions disguised toxic loans with others who were not, creating packages, the perverted packages. These, in turn, were subject to new transactions targeted to other entities (which obviously did not warn the gambit). With it, banks got rid of noxious loans on their balance sheets while new (surreptitious) assets appeared healthy. This technique, called « securitization of credit », is perfectly legal but it has been denatured in those circumstances. In theory it happens to convert assets (loans, for example) in securities or bank values. In practice, the conversion was made based on personal loans, thus giving rise to corrupted assets because the failed effects remained hidden behind the creditworthy assets. The hoax is unquestionable as long as the U.S. banks have accepted the situation and many Western banks assumed the subprimes without question. Since then the new titles became « marketable securities » throughout the world, ie they were admissible to official stock exchange quoting and were therefore transferable in the stock market. Titles invaded Western markets and, little by little, the deposit banks collapsed: some were aware of it and others suspected insolvent loans in their portfolio, but they were incapable to determine how many and how important they were. The perversion led to extreme fraud: there were cases where the mortgage ownership on a home was split throughout several titles so as to detach and include them throughout different packages. Who bids higher?
Very few banks were clever enough to assess their risk or that of their neighbor whom, so far, traded cash daily. Mistrust among banks generalized and interbank credit was finished off.
As for Q4 2008, the real (productive) economy suffered strongly the bias effect of the increasing blockade of credit lines to businesses and small firms. From then on, banks do not guarantee their fundamental duty, i.e. the necessary cash « irrigation » in order to keep in force the levels of trade.
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Adam Smith in his 





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It is a simple but worrisome observation. One can easily recognize the persistence of the dreadful conditions on companies’ financial position within the United States and the Euro area as well. There’s all but evidence: evolution of the notes granted for the credit to companies, bankruptcies, lesser productivity, etc… The reasons are well-known: credit becomes more and more expensive, much more difficult to obtain and the production in the manufacturing sector moves back more quickly than employment, even if everywhere the companies react very quickly by reducing their enrollment.
I have just read the book. And it is a rather surprisingly pessimistic –and surprisingly (to my mind) reactionary– assessment of the state of politics and society in Europe. In particular, Todd apparently emphasizes the socially stabilizing value of religion and calls for protectionist trade barriers.
