Northern Africa: A Choice between Reform and Stability

An Egyptian army band plays music in Cairo's Tahrir Square during celebrations marking one week after Egypt's long-time president Hosni Mubarak was forced out of office

In the wake of uprisings in North Africa, West may be forced to make a choice between much-needed reform or stable dictatorships. NATO will need to reconsider its newest partnerships, beyond the interest of its allies, and start guaranteeing actual security.

Doused in paint thinner, Mohamed Bouazizi set himself alight in Tunisia on Dec. 17, sparking a string of protests throughout northern Africa. The 20-year old college graduate, angry after the government confiscated his source of income- a fruit cart- and beat him, has been credited as the beginning of a series of uprisings in North Africa.

Protests have now spread to Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen, as well as Morocco and Algeria. Citizens have taken to the streets in protest of high food prices, and even higher unemployment rates, and general discontent with, in many cases, decades of inefficient dictatorial regimes.

With protests mounting from country to country, igniting passion for reform in nations’ citizens, the uprisings of North Africa may be the 21st century’s Berlin Wall. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen recognizes the potential effect the uprisings could have on the world order, but says, “The outcome of this turmoil remains unclear.”

Resource-rich North Africa has become a strategic battlefield among the US, Europe, China and Russia. The US and Europe seemed to prevail under two NATO initiatives: the Mediterranean Dialogue and a military alliance with the 53 countries of the African Union (AU).

Member nations of the AU and the Mediterranean Dialogue are believed to benefit from the initiatives under the broad public goals of countering security threats against Africa and using NATO as a model for the African Standby Force. But NATO members will receive more concrete benefits, such as limiting Russian and Chinese expansion and blocking arms suppliers of non-NATO members.

The interests of NATO fake ahead, devoid of serious regard to its public objectives. Rasmussen has outlined his concerns with the uprisings in terms of its impact upon the Middle East peace process and a possible increase of illegal immigration to Europe, validating NATO-centric concerns to the world under a “we don’t interfere in domestic politics” stance. Forget about partnerships, dialogues, and goals.

This lack of response from NATO is only amplified by a muted response from the US, with Europe following suit. Though Obama exercised caution in denouncing violence against peaceful protesters in Libya out of fear that the Gadhafi regime would target American nationals in Libya, Washington was also slow to react to protests in Egypt earlier in February.

Only after receiving strong criticism in the media did Obama denounce Mubarak, a long-time ally to the US, calling for transition “now.” Washington has supported up dictatorial regimes, such as that of Mubarak, for decades, benefiting from such stable relationships with dictators. In Egypt, which has been known to hold and torture terrorist suspects for the US, there has been a “protect us in our war and we will forgive your human rights abuses” policy. It seems US policy is in support of stable dictators, rather than fledgling democracies. Why would the US and NATO, which so avidly promote democracy, not have supported it in North Africa?

“The US and allies pull out no stops to prevent democracy because of major energy resources,” says Noam Chomsky, a well-respected American intellectual. In fact, as the protests spread to Libya, the major concern in the US was rising gas prices, not Gadhafi dropping bombs on his own citizens and executing Libyan soldiers who refused to kill their compatriots. Oil prices, which could reach $220 per barrel if Libya and Algeria, both dealing with internal protests, were to cut off oil supplies, could slow down economic recovery.

Both NATO and the US have screened selfish intentions behind national sovereignty, but after decades of support for allied dictators and more recent initiatives for a firm grasp on African affairs, perhaps it is not an honest stance to take. And if the US and NATO do not take a stance, we should hope they set aside potential gains and focus on allowing the internal movements of Africa choose the next step.

Recently, NATO has urged all parties to stop violence and ensure peaceful transition to democracy. A little less recently, Mubarak urged protestors for ‘orderly transitions’ that only served to postpone change. While we can hope and urge for peaceful transitions, we must remember that NATO should not be just a collection of military power, but also a political entity with a widely stated goal to “promote democratic values to build trust and prevent conflict in the long-run. To prevent conflict in the long run, might it be in the best interests of North Africa to allow reform?

West cannot both call for stability and advocate reform. It will need to reconsider its newest partnerships, beyond the interest of its allies, and start guaranteeing actual security.

War of words

While we wait for history to judge the decision of the Security Council, words place themselves as judges.

The war in Libya is not virtual but very real. Then the outcome depends a lot on the war of words. Prudence dictates to wait for a positive outcome (with a free Libya at the end of the tunnel) or a disastrous issue instead (with a Muammar el-Qaddafi stronger and more upset than ever) for the decision of the UN Security Council to be judged in the light of history … And while we wait for the history words place themselves as judges — words used to judge what is happening in Libya.

The purpose of resolution 1973 of the Security Council was to protect the Libyan people against the tyrant, but as this reality bothers the tyrant he relieves all sorts of conceivable semantic tricks to transvesty reality and attempt to pass for a victim. Seeing is believing. Muammar el-Qaddafi vows to protect his people against the foreign invader when in fact it is about protecting the very people from the aggression of the tyrant. The crasser is the lie the more likely it is to pass through as true. And it would be a mistake to trifle with it because although the colonel’s propaganda is particularly rough and fallacious, his misinformation affects those whom such propaganda is flattering given their self-interest or ideological reasons. Such as in the case of some countries, headed by China (whom Muammar el-Qaddafi has promised concessions in the Libyan oil if they look the other way – thus allowing him to get out of trouble), as in the case of other regimes - Arab or not - who have no desire for the UN interfering in their affairs to ensure compliance or not with human rights in their respective countries.

But there is a category even more revolting: that of narrow-minded and dumb ideologists  for which any intervention involving Western countries is imperialist by nature. These zealous advocates suffer from true migraines because if, by any chance, Westerners were not a horde of unkind and greedy people, then the imposture  would not fit into their lowbrow straitjacket. It has to be particularly indigestible for them to witness how Western and Arab countries assume jointly undeniable risks to save Libyan rebels – including those who are shouting “Allahu Akbar “. The more if you believe upside down in the war of civilizations and that you deem the intervention hides, as usual, other unlawful and guilt-producing interests.

What then is the alternative to doing nothing?
Muammar el-Qaddafi counts on that – unfortunately widespread – ominous approach. That’s why it is essential to avoid falling into the trap by describing this coalition as a typical western one and try on the contrary to associate the largest possible number of Arab countries. It was not easy to reach an agreement and this alliance will not last long, we know that. As soon as the first air strikes took place, the secretary general of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, started disassociating oneself. In fact, this former Mubarak minister, greeted by some Egyptians for his hostility to Israel and his support to the revolution, has just one thing in mind: to become the next president of Egypt. And in this case, Mr. Amr Moussa wanted to bet on all winning horses to seduce western countries by giving support to the resolution draft, but without having to accommodate and assume the consequences in the eyes of the Arab citizens in general and in Egyptians’  in particular. The dude in fact bet on Russian and Chinese veto power. But it was not so. Hence his current confusion and hardship, especially having regard to the Egyptian people sensitivity, whose solidarity with the suffering of the Libyan people is more than obvious. The opportunism of Mr. Amr Moussa is currently blamed by Egyptians: he wanted to flatter the people and adulate their demons. He got the wrong war and marched out of step as Libya’s events have nothing to do with the war in Iraq: rebels yell in Benghazi without blushing: “Merci la France, Thak U America” (which for sure would not last long, we know that): indeed, many who now criticize the military intervention would make a great fuss if the United Nations had been passive not facing the massacres of Muammar el-Qaddafi. If the UN would have done so, now Benghazi would have fallen into the hands of the tyrant, the people would have been crushed and probably the Arab spring would have come to an end.

 

While we wait for history to judge the decision of the Security Council words place themselves as judges.

The war in Libya is not virtual but very real. Then the outcome depends a lot on the war of words. Prudence dictates to wait for a positive outcome (with a free Libya at the end of the tunnel) or else a disastrous issue (with a Colonel Gaddafi stronger and more upset than ever) for the decision of the Security Council of UN to be judged in the light of history … And while we wait for the history words set themselves up as judges, words used to judge what is happening in Libya.

The purpose of resolution 1973 of the Security Council was to protect the Libyan people against the tyrant, but as this reality bothers the tyrant he relieves all sorts of conceivable semantic tricks to transvesting reality and attempt to pass for a victim. Seeing is believing. Colonel Gaddafi vows to protect his people against the foreign invader when in fact it is about protecting the very people from the aggression of the tyrant. The crasser is the lie the more likely it is to pass through as true. And it would be a mistake to trifle with it because although the colonel’s propaganda is particularly rough and fallacious, his misinformation affects those whom such propaganda is flattering given their self-interest or ideological reasons. Such as in the case of some countries, headed by China (whom Gaddafi has promised concessions in the Libyan oil if they look the other way – thus allowing him to get out of trouble), as is the case of other regimes - Arab or otherwise - who have no desire for the UN interfering in their affairs to ensure compliance or not tof human rights in their respective countries.

But there is a category even more awful: the narrow-minded and dumb ideologues for which any intervention involving Western countries is imperialist by nature. They suffer from true migraines because the opposing would not fit into their intellectual straitjacket. It should be particularly indigestible for them seeing how Western and Arab countries assume jointly undeniable risks to save Libyan rebels – including those who are shouting “Allahu Akbar “. Even more if one believes in the war of civilizations upside down and says that the intervention hides other unlawful interests.

What then is the alternative to doing nothing?
And the colonel Qaddafi counts on that – unfortunately widespread – ominous approach. That’s why it is essential to avoid falling into the trap by describing this coalition as western one and try on the contrary to associate the largest possible number of Arab countries. It was not easy to reach an agreement and this alliance will not last long, we know that. As soon as the first air strikes took place, the secretary general of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, started disassociating oneself. In fact, this former Mubarak minister, greeted by some Egyptians for his hostility to Israel and his support to the revolution, has just one thing in mind: to become the next president of Egypt. And in this case, Mr. Amr Moussa wanted to bet on all winning horses to seduce western countries by giving support to the resolution draft, but without having to accommodate and assume the consequences in the eyes of the Arab citizen in general and Egyptians in particular. The dude in fact bet on Russian and Chinese veto power. But it was not so. Hence his current confusion and hardship, especially having regard to the Egyptian people sensitivity, whose solidarity with the suffering of the Libyan people is more than obvious. The opportunism of Mr. Amr Moussa is currently blamed by Egyptians: he wanted to flatter the people and adulate their demons. He got the wrong war and marched out of step as Libya’s events have nothing to do with the war in Iraq: rebels yell in Benghazi without blushing: “Merci la France, Merci l’Amérique “ (which not last long, we know that): indeed, many who now criticize the military intervention would make a great fuss if the United Nations had been passive not facing the massacres of Gaddafi. At present Benghazi would have fallen into the hands of the tyrant, the people would have been crushed and probably the Arab spring would have come to an end.

Libya, the international community and the responsibility to protect

The situation in Libya requires the international community to get involved early. In such cases, the problem of sovereignty must give way to the responsibility to protect. The international community cannot accept that the government of Muammar el-Qaddafi keeps on insisting that these are facts that relate only to Libyan domestic policy, then to be managed in terms of domestic policy.

The international community’s response must be fast, firm and effective. The history of Rwanda in 1994, Srebrenica and Darfur does not allow us to be very optimistic about the effectiveness of the international community when responding to emergency situations. But we must try it. A special meeting on Libya took place at the Human Rights Council in Geneva on Friday February 25. The next day, the Security Council of United Nations met in New York in this regard. This last resort has ultimately a role and in particular the International Criminal Court – once the ICC is entitled to act at the request of the executive organ of the UN.

The fact that the Security Council of United Nations recognizes that the Libyan issue is of its concern, portends a significant point. At most if the Council just requested the ICC to take hand in the matter. Libya is not a State Party to the Rome Statute (1). Conversely, the Security Council can always promote preliminary investigations: in the case of Darfur, the Council established an investigation committee headed by Italian jurist Antonio Cassese (2). The work of the commission allowed the ICC to be aware and to have jurisdiction on the atrocities committed in the Darfur region.

Such a committee would be useful in elucidating the events in Libya and would be a quick reaction faster to materialize in situ. Its presence and implementation would largely stem the state of violence and abuses that run on the ground at the moment. There are precedents.

So, can the UN act effectively? What can be done?

Both much and little. Because the United Nations are States. The ones that might be fully involved and committed. There has been progress lately, yet the UN machine still remains slow-moving today. The Security Council meets permanently and the Human Rights Council can be in session urgently. Obviously a watchdog having a streamlined executive resolving power would be more effective, but the reality of the current international relations does not allow a real quick response in dealing with such concerns.

Since Monday 28 February, the Human Rights Council shall be meeting for 3 weeks. Surely Libya shall be at the center of the debate. Last Friday, during the Council special session, while the Libyan seat remained empty in the morning, the second secretary at the Libyan embassy in the UN announced in the afternoon, amidst loud applause, that from that moment the Libyan delegation in Geneva represented « the free people of Libya. »

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(1)  The treaty that established the International Criminal Court (ICC). Adopted in Rome on July 17, 1998, and that 139 countries have now ratified.

(2) Antonio Cassese was the first President of the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia. He is Professor of International Law at the University of Florence and Editor in Chief of the Journal of International Criminal Justice

Related Posts:

· The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in the spotlight

Revolts put focus on Arab civil society

Youth revolts in Tunisia and Egypt could spread throughout the Maghreb and the Arab World as the discontented masses take to the streets.

Street clamor is not exactly the same in Egypt as in Tunisia

In Tunisia, a popular insurrection knocked down a dictator for the first time in Arab history. In the meantime, the largest protests in decades have broken out in Egypt. Could Morocco and Algeria be next?

Tunisia’s revolution generated tremors not just in Egypt. Throughout the Maghreb, authoritarian regimes like those in Morocco and Algeria have a difficult time addressing the frustration and despair of their young populations. Could the revolutionary example set in Tunisia take root among its neighbors?

The revolution arose on mid December when a desperate, unemployed computer scientist named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in the small town of Sidi Bouzid. Bouazizi’s death symbolized the despair of a generation, triggering a series of general protests that ultimately swept longtime dictator President Ben Ali from power.

“We have 13 percent unemployment but the figures in the interior of the country are significantly higher, sometimes upwards of 70 percent,” said Adelwahab El Hani, a Tunisian human rights lawyer from Sidi Bouzid. “80,000 Tunisians have just finished up with their studies and they need jobs. That’s an enormous challenge for the government.”

Extreme imbalances and poor human rights records
One Tunisian student said it was like the top cover had shot off of a pressure cooker. He wasn’t just alluding to his homeland, but to the entire Maghreb. In Morocco, half the population is under 25 years old and 40 percent of them do not have a steady job. Young graduates are especially hard hit. The grumbling from the streets has become audible. Sure, there are limited political freedoms, woman’s rights, a parliament and a government – but no genuine open democracy. The military and secret police are omnipresent. The social imbalances are extreme.

“Motives for these kinds of revolts are all over the Maghreb,” said Francis Ghiles, from the Center for International Studies in Barcelona. “The elites in Morocco live the high life, but that doesn’t guarantee social stability. The pie can’t just belong to the rich. When there’s no redistribution of wealth, when the upper class parades around arrogantly, then there will be revolt someday.”

In Algeria it has already reached that point. This massive land is a social barrel of gunpowder. In January there were wounded during protests against high grocery prices. In many Algerian cities, the young expressed their rage in a flurry of stones, tear gas grenades and Molotov cocktails.

Algeria’s government promised to take decisive action, but the country is politically stagnant. Longtime President Abdelaziz Bouteflika is supported by a corrupt clique of military officers and secret police. Three-fourths of Algerians are under 30. Most of them do not have jobs, lodging or perspective. All this despite the fact that the state strongboxes are full with money from oil and gas exports.

Algeria “has accumulated 150 billion euros in foreign exchange,” Ghiles said. “The problem is not a lack of money, but a clientele economy. It’s a casino. There’s no order, no plan, no perspective. And on top of that the government is autistic. Those in power just don’t listen, they don’t see the problems of their people, or they simply just don’t want to see.”

But now they have to see. A growing number of desperate, well-educated young people are extinguishing themselves in gasoline and lighting themselves on fire: In Egypt, in Yemen, in Mauretania and also in Algeria. Just like Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia, whose final act of self-determination set a whole country in flames.

Domino effect
Ghiles believes that the so called “Jasmine Revolution” in Tunisia is a historic event that has shaken the entire Maghreb. However, he does not believe that it will set off a domino effect which collapses other authoritarian regimes throughout the region. The Moroccan King Mohammed VI has a broad power base and his role as the highest religious leader of the Moroccan people lends him additional legitimacy.

In Algeria the middle class, which played a critical role in Tunisia, has largely disappeared. There has been social turmoil for years, but the regime has never been seriously threatened. The military and secret police are so tightly connected with the halls of power and the oil and natural gas industries that they have too much to lose in a revolution.

In glaring contrast to Tunisia, the Algerian army would gun down demonstrators. And nobody wants a new civil war in Algeria – the last one cost 200,000 lives. Even if the states of the Maghreb do not fall like dominoes, Tunisia serves as a warning. When these kinds of events repeat themselves, like recently in Algeria or a few years ago in Morocco, or even in Tunisia or Egypt, then governments have to draw some conclusions. If they don’t do that, then the pressure cook will explode – just somewhat later.
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Francis Ghiles, The Maghreb refuses to share, Le Monde Diplomatique, Feb. 2010; El Coste del No-Maghreb, IEMed and ToledoPax, Madrid, May 2006 and Barcelona, Nov. 2007.